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MRAPs, Irregular Warfare,
and Pentagon Reform
U.S. Army (Kamil Sztalkoper)

By C h r i s t o p h e r J . L a m b , M a t t h e w J . Sc h m i d t ,
and B e r i t G . F i t z s i m m o n s

M

U.S. Army (David J. Marshall)

Army Chief of Staff reviews photographs of
vehicle damage caused by IEDs in Afghanistan

ine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles offer an excellent case study
for investigating the current debate over the Pentagon’s emphasis on develop
ing and fielding irregular warfare capabilities. The debate was highlighted by
a series of recent articles in Joint Force Quarterly,1 including one by Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates, who cited the slow fielding of MRAPs as a prime example of the Pen
tagon’s institutional resistance to investments in irregular warfare capabilities. He personally
intervened to ensure more than 10,000 MRAPs were fielded quickly. Yet some analysts now
argue MRAPs are not really useful for irregular warfare and are prohibitively expensive.2 As
General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), asserted, “It is the wrong vehicle, too late, to fit a threat we
were actually managing.”3

Soldiers in MRAPs clear vegetation that could conceal IEDs
along roadside in Iraq
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By June 2003, 3 months after the initial
coalition intervention in Iraq, improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) had emerged as
the enemy’s weapon of choice. That month,
then–U.S. Central Command commander
General John Abizaid, USA, declared IEDs his
“No. 1 threat.” By December the percentage
of fatalities caused by IEDs rose to roughly
half of all U.S. combat deaths, and from the
summer of 2005 until the spring of 2008, they
caused 50 to 80 percent of U.S. fatalities (see
figure 1). The threat evolved over time, but
all major forms of IEDs were apparent early
on—by 2004 or 2005 at the latest. Initially, the
enemy tossed charges under moving vehicles
but soon began using roadside bombs set off
remotely by electronic devices. As up-armored
Humvees became more prevalent, insurgents
buried large bombs in the roads to attack their

one part of the solution, but there were few
options readily available. The Army could
only find about 200 up-armored Humvees
to deliver to Iraq. Clearly more were needed.
Two courses of action were taken. First, the
Army decided to procure more up-armored
Humvees to replace the thin-skinned versions. The Army worked with manufacturers to increase production from 51 vehicles
per month in August 2003 to 400 vehicles
per month in September 2004, and later to

by early 2005, insurgents were using improvised explosive
devices to conduct both side and under-vehicle attacks against
the entire range of U.S. armored vehicles
insurgents, but they caused 40 percent of IED
casualties. From spring into summer 2005,
their use increased from about one per week
to roughly one every other day.
The IED Challenge and Initial Armor
Decisions. Field commanders and Washington also realized early on that IEDs were a
complex problem requiring a multifaceted
response. Better armored vehicles would be

550 vehicles per month. Second, the Army
approved the emergency expedient of adding
armor kits to the existing Humvees because
they could be fielded more quickly than the
up-armored Humvees.
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) monitored these efforts and,
pursuing a mandate from Representative
Duncan Hunter (R–CA), took it upon itself to

Figure 1. Percentage of IED-caused Fatalities and Total Fatalities
Fatalities
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IEDs and Armored Vehicles in Iraq

soft underbellies. By early 2005, insurgents
were using IEDs to conduct both side and
under-vehicle attacks against the entire range
of U.S. armored vehicles. They also were using
a particularly lethal form of IED known as the
explosively formed penetrator (EFP), which is
able to better penetrate armor and, in doing
so, spray elements of the weapons and the
vehicle armor into the vehicle’s interior. The
sophisticated EFPs never amounted to more
than 5 to 10 percent of the IEDs employed by

Fatalities

The controversial MRAPs raise two
questions. First, does the MRAP experience
support the contention that the Pentagon is
not sufficiently able to field irregular warfare
capabilities? Second, what factors best explain
the MRAP failure, whether that failure is
determined to be their delayed fielding or the
fact that they were fielded at all? We conclude
that MRAPs are a valid irregular warfare
requirement and that the Pentagon should
have been better prepared to field them, albeit
not on the scale demanded by events in Iraq.
We also argue that the proximate cause of
the failure to quickly field MRAPs is not the
Pentagon’s acquisition system but rather the
requirements process, reinforced by more
fundamental organizational factors. These
findings suggest that acquisition reform is the
wrong target for advancing Secretary Gates’
objective of improving irregular warfare capabilities, and that achieving the objective will
require more extensive reforms than many
realize.

10

Explosively formed projectiles arrive
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The box represents the roughly 2-year period before the 2007 “surge” when U.S. operational strategy
was to reduce risks to U.S. forces and transfer security responsibilities to Iraq.
Sources: Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason Campbell, The Iraq Index (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution), available at <www.brookings.edu/FP/saban/iraq/index.pdf>; Defense Manpower Data
Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division, available at <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/
personnel/CASUALTY/OIF-Total-by-month.pdf>; Andrew Feickert, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected
(MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007),
available at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22707.pdf>; and various reports from Defense News,
The New York Times, DefenseLink, and The Washington Post.
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investigate Pentagon claims that production of
the add-on kits could not be accelerated. The
HASC staffers shuttled between manufactur
ers and suppliers, using their private sector
experience to clear production bottlenecks
and get the kits into the field. With Congress
pushing hard, the Pentagon and several Army
depots increased production from 35 kits
per month in December 2003 to 600 kits per
month by July 2004. Consequently, 7,000 kits
were delivered 6 months ahead of the Penta
gon’s original timetable. Still, only 5,330 of
the 8,105 up-armored Humvees required by
September 2004 were in place.
As the IED problem grew and insuf
ficient numbers of up-armored Humvees
were available, innovative U.S. troops began
adding improvised armor to their vehicles.

Within a week of the exchange with the
Soldier in Kuwait, Secretary Rumsfeld made
delivery of up-armored Humvees and add-on
armor kits a priority, and Pentagon officials
“vowed to eliminate the armored-vehicle
shortage in Iraq and Afghanistan within six
months.”4 The Army was compliant but not
enthusiastic. The Service’s Director of Force
Development noted both the expense of the
program (over $4 billion) and the Secretary’s
determination: “This is an enormously
expensive program, but very frankly, the com
munication from the secretary of defense has
been real clear.”5
The Political Problem. Pressure to do
more to counter IEDs did not begin with the
concerned Soldier’s question to Secretary
Rumsfeld. Representative Hunter and the

incensed that in the President’s budget request
for fiscal year 2005, the Army had categorized
the up-armored Humvee and add-on armor
kits as “unfunded” requirements: “At a time
when you’re in a war fight and you’ve got
these IEDs . . . and we’re taking fairly sub
stantial casualties, why would force protec
tion, such as up-armor, ever be an unfunded
requirement?”6
When it became clear that even the
up-armored Humvees offered insufficient
protection against IEDs, Senators from across
the political spectrum, including Ted Stevens
(R–AK) and Joe Biden (D–DE), weighed in on
what Missouri Republican Kit Bond decried
as an unacceptable “set of bureaucratic delays”
in fielding MRAPs. Media and whistleblower
exposés, war college studies, congressional
investigations, and inspector general reports
castigated Pentagon performance. Legislators
complained about the inability to “legislate
a sense of urgency” and withheld funding
until improvements in armor were made. In
short, there was sustained political pressure
to do something about the IED problem and
provide better vehicular armor to the troops.
Pentagon Organizational Adaptation.
The Pentagon did not anticipate or prepare
well for the possibility of postwar disorder. As
many studies have concluded, senior civilian
leadership expected U.S. military forces to
leave Iraq quickly. This proved impossible
as the insurgency heated up and produced
U.S. Marine Corps (Jason W. Fudge)

Marines put Cougar H 4x4 MRAP
through offroad course test

Scrap metal, plywood, and sandbags were
used to increase protection. The problem was
highlighted in December 2004 when a Soldier
complained about the improvised armor to
then–Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
in a town hall meeting in Kuwait. The Sec
retary’s response about “going to war with
the Army you have” and his further explana
tion that the lack of armor was a “problem
of physics” implied nothing could be done
about the situation, which elicited a firestorm
of protest from Members of Congress, the
public, and manufacturers who insisted they
could increase production to meet the needs
of U.S. troops.
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HASC were already on the task. However, the
incident propelled the armor issue into the
public consciousness. In Congress, numer
ous Representatives and Senators from both
parties complained about the Pentagon’s
inadequate efforts to supply the troops with
armor as well as other irregular warfare
equipment such as body armor and electronic
jammers. Hunter was particularly active. His
HASC hearings on military acquisition were
excruciating for the Pentagon. In an April 21,
2004, hearing, Hunter related in detail how he
and his staff also had built a perfectly useable
up-armored Humvee with help from Home
Depot. Hunter and his staff were particularly

the enemy intended to use
improvised explosive devices
and distribute the images
of their effects to force the
United States to leave Iraq
casualties that contributed to declining
American public support for the interven
tion. As General George Casey, USA, thencommander of Multi-National Force–Iraq,
noted in 2004, the enemy intended to use
IEDs and distribute the images of their effects
to force the United States to leave Iraq. Pen
tagon leaders knew that countering IEDs was
imperative.
In response, a new organization to
combat IEDs was created. In September 2003,
at the behest of General Abizaid, the Army set
up a small unit dedicated to defeating IEDs,
which adopted the motto: “Stop the bleeding.”
The task force concentrated on the portion
of the IED problem “left of the boom”—that
n dupress.ndu.edu
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prerogative of the military Services based on
their assessment of requirements.
MRAP Requirements: The Lost 2
Years. Field commanders wanted more
armor in general and MRAPs in particular.
First, a Military Police commander in Iraq
issued an urgent request in June 2003 for
armored security vehicles (ASVs) to help
protect U.S. military convoys and patrols.
The ASVs were lighter than the MRAPs that
were ultimately fielded but similarly designed
for better protection against mines and other
ambushes. Also late in the summer of 2003,
the Army’s 101st Airborne Division issued a
plea for more vehicle armor and training to
evade IEDs. In September, other command
ers began to request MRAPs. By November,
a draft “urgent universal need statement” for

The slow approval of MRAP require
ments did not reflect lack of appreciation for
their effectiveness. Early and throughout the
war, U.S. experts on military requirements
recommended armored cars and MRAPs for
Iraqi forces also under attack from IEDs, but
those in charge of Pentagon requirements did
not think they were a good fit for the U.S. mili
tary. An internal Marine Corps report9 found
that the Marine requirements process largely
discounted the need for MRAPs. When Marine
Corps senior leaders convened on March
29–30, 2005, to consider the need for MRAPs,
flag officers heard a strong case for their
immediate purchase from a Marine who had
long studied their value in irregular warfare.
The assistant commandant of the Marine
Corps then “directed the Deputy Commandant

Figure 2. Trendline for IED Fatalities Before the Surge and MRAP
Deployments
Figure 2: Trendline for IED Fatalities Before the Surge and MRAP Deployments
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is, on improving ways to avoid IEDs and
attacking the ability of insurgents to make,
emplace, and control the IEDs before they
went off. The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force
also put its emphasis on solutions “left of the
boom.” The following summer, in July 2004,
the Army-centric task force was upgraded to
an Army-led Joint Integrated Process Team to
harness the expertise of all the Services. From
September 2004 on, the Secretary of Defense
and Deputy Secretary of Defense issued
memoranda authorizing expedited procure
ment of equipment designed to save lives
and created the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell
(JRAC) for that purpose. The following year,
the Pentagon upgraded its efforts to combat
IEDs by creating the Joint IED Task Force. By
the time the Joint IED Task Force became the
Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), it
controlled hundreds of personnel and annual
budgets of more than $3 billion.
The Pentagon organizations dedicated
to countering IEDs could claim some success.
IED effectiveness (measured by the ability to
produce coalition casualties) dropped from
a high of over 50 percent early in the war to
less than 10 percent effectiveness by the time
MRAPs began flowing to theater in the fall of
2007. Thus, JIEDDO and other counter-IED
efforts such as up-armored Humvees reduced
the average effectiveness of an insurgent IED
attack, thereby forcing insurgents to stage
more attacks to obtain equivalent effects.
Unfortunately, the insurgents were able to
do so and actually to increase their ability to
inflict U.S. fatalities (see figure 2). Clearly, the
battle against IEDs was not being won.
In this context, considering better
armored vehicles was an obvious option,
but JIEDDO did not push the issue for two
reasons. First, the organization focused more
on prevention than protection. The predilec
tion for working the IED problem left of the
boom was consistent with an offensive mental
ity (attacking the IED network) and offered the
possibility of a more elegant solution if it could
be achieved. This orientation was so strong
that some JIEDDO members were dismissive
of field commanders for wanting to “place
a cocoon around the soldier driving down
the street in his vehicle” rather than “taking
out the IEDs first.”7 Second, JIEDDO did not
have responsibility for acquisition of better
armored vehicles. Its mandate allowed it to
fund development of better armor for MRAPs,
but it did not have authority to procure and
sustain better armored vehicles, which was the

MRAPs from a Marine field commander was
circulating in the Pentagon. The final version,
sent on February 17, 2005, made the case that
the Marines should not continue to absorb
casualties from IEDs when commercial offthe-shelf MRAPs are available, and that these
avoidable casualties carried the “potential to
jeopardize mission success.”8 Despite such
requests from the field, it took more than
2 years, political pressure from Congress,
and a determined intervention by the Sec
retary of Defense before the JROC validated
a large purchase of MRAPs as a military
requirement.

for Combat Development and Integration to
review the feasibility of developing or buying a
new, mine-resistant tactical vehicle to replace
the [Humvee] and to present the results at the
next Executive Safety Board meeting.”10 That
did not happen. Instead, the decision was made
to hold out for a future vehicle that would meet
all the requirements for mobility and protec
tion better than either the up-armored Humvee
or MRAPs. The Army requirements process
was even less favorably inclined toward the
vehicle, always moving more slowly than the
Marines to approve MRAP requirements and
in smaller numbers.
issue 55, 4 th quarter 2009 / JFQ     79
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Field commanders persisted, however,
and in 2006 finally succeeded in getting the
Pentagon requirements process to approve the
vehicles. On May 21, 2006, the commanding
general, Multi-National Force–West, submit
ted a request for 185 MRAPs to the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC),
and in July he submitted a request for 1,000
more. The eventual approval of the require
ment for 1,185 MRAPs cleared the way for
a joint acquisition program, which began
in November 2006. However, an approved
MRAP requirement did not guarantee the
program a high priority, as was soon made
clear by HASC testimony on March 13, 2007,
by Generals Robert Magnus, USMC, and
Richard Cody, USA.
General Magnus acknowledged MRAPs
are “up to 400 percent more effective than
the up-armored Humvees in reducing inju
ries and deaths” and can “cut casualties by
perhaps as much as two-thirds.”11 Yet just
as the Services classified armor kits and
up-armored Humvees as “unfunded require
ments” in 2004, General Magnus and General
Cody explained to the dismayed HASC in the

spring of 2007 that MRAPs were unfunded
requirements. When General Cody noted
the Army “did not have a valid requirement
except for 335 MRAP vehicles when the
2008 Title IV supplemental was being built,”
he was interrupted by Representative Gene
Taylor (D–MS):
But we are getting back to that word requirement. And I have pointed out three instances
where somebody tried to fight this war on the
cheap [with needless casualties] because of
body armor, because of Humvees and because
of jammers. So the question is: Why do we go
through this again? . . . If this vehicle is going
to save lives, if Humvees, as we now know, are
vulnerable to mines and a hugely disproportionate number of casualties are occurring in
Humvees because of mines and we have a way
to address that, why don’t we address it now?
Taylor complained that the Army “seems to
be dragging their feet.” General Magnus then
intervened to support General Cody and
argued that MRAPs were a “rapidly evolving
requirement over the past three months.”12

an approved MRAP requirement did not guarantee the
program a high priority, as was soon made clear by
House Armed Services Committee testimony

Almost 3 years after units in the field
submitted their requests for MRAPs, the Pen
tagon requirements system had moved to the
point where senior Service leadership could
invite Congress to pay for a large number of
the vehicles if it was willing to do so over and
above the Pentagon’s normal budget and its
warfighting supplemental. Two months later,
Secretary Gates announced MRAPs were the
Pentagon’s number-one acquisition priority.
Shortly thereafter, the JROC validated huge
MRAP requirements, first for 7,774 and then
for 15,374 vehicles.
Strategy Significance: The MRAP
Impact. Fielding MRAPs would have sup
ported both the U.S. operational strategy
under General Casey and the substantially
revised U.S. approach to the insurgency under
General David Petraeus. With encouragement
from civilian leadership looking forward to a
withdrawal of some U.S. forces, Casey’s opera
tional strategy was to pull U.S. forces back and
reduce casualties while pushing Iraqi forces
forward into the fight. Fielding MRAPs would
have complemented Casey’s strategy well by
better protecting U.S. forces as they moved to
and from their protected enclaves, reducing
political pressure for rapid withdrawal, and
buying time for the transition to reliance on
the Iraqi army and police. When MRAPs were
finally approved as a requirement for U.S.
forces in mid-2007, General Petraeus’s new

MRAPs wait to be unloaded from USNS Pililaau at
Shuaybah Port, Kuwait
U.S. Navy (Kelvin Surgener)
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reduction in IED-related (not total) fatali
ties postulated by General Magnus in 2007
would have been dramatic (see figure 4).
Such a drop in casualties would have reduced
political pressure for withdrawal and bought
time for Casey’s strategy of pushing Iraqi
forces forward, just as it facilitated the strat
egy of securing the population that General
Petraeus supported.

Explaining Delayed Fielding
The overview of the Pentagon’s record
on fielding MRAPs corrects some mis
taken impressions and substantiates some
popular concerns. The following points bear
emphasis:
■■ The Pentagon was poorly prepared for
irregular warfare and the IED ambush tactics
it encountered in Iraq.
■■ The IED threat evolved, but all types
of IED attacks—side, underbody, and EFP—
were evident by 2004 or 2005 at the latest, so
the need for better armored vehicles requested
by commanders in the field was evident.
■■ While the acquisition system had to be
pushed to provide armor kits and up-armored
Humvees faster, the Pentagon did make
special efforts to address the IED problem.
■■ Despite huge resources (for example,
$12.4 billion for JIEDDO from 2006 to
2008), the new organizations did not have
the authority to tackle the IED problem in a
comprehensive manner—particularly where
armoring vehicles was concerned—and

instead focused on attacking the precursors to
IED explosions.
■■ Senior military leaders only validated
better armored vehicle requirements under
pressure from two Secretaries of Defense and
Congress, despite the demonstrated effective
ness of better armored vehicles and early
appeals from field commanders.
■■ The acquisition system fielded effec
tive MRAPs quickly once they were approved
and funded not only because Congress and
Secretary Gates made them a top priority but
also because the system had already developed
and tested MRAP prototypes.
In retrospect, it is clear that the acqui
sition system was not responsible for the
Pentagon’s lack of preparedness for irregular
warfare or its inability to respond quickly
to the need for better armored vehicles. The

testimony in March 2007 to
the effect that MRAPs could
“cut casualties by perhaps as
much as two-thirds” seems
well founded
glaring deficiency was in the Pentagon’s
requirements system, which requires further
explanation.
Armored Vehicles and Military
Requirements. The major tradeoffs between
MRAPs and lighter tactical vehicles were
well understood from the beginning. As

Figure 3. MRAPs Deployed and Percentage of IED-caused Casualties
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strategy was just being implemented. He sup
ported the dispersion of an increasing number
of U.S. forces (the so-called surge of five addi
tional Army brigades) among the Iraq popula
tion, principally in Baghdad. The acquisition
system was already primed to move quickly
on MRAPs before the Iraq War began because
Army engineers had negotiated the Army
requirements process well enough to obtain
a handful of MRAP prototypes for clearing
mines from transportation routes.13 This
fact, along with the support of Congress and
Secretary Gates, allowed more than 10,000
MRAPs to be fielded in record time—about a
year and a half.
The MRAPs made a significant impact
once they arrived in theater, but their effect
was obscured by the decline in violence that
accompanied the American shift in strategy
under General Petraeus. In addition to other
factors such as cooperation with Sunni
tribal leaders, the surge in U.S. forces and
General Petraeus’s emphasis on population
security helped produce a sharp drop in vio
lence—including IED attacks—from summer
2007 onward. That drop meant fewer U.S.
casualties. As expected, American casualties
(fatalities and wounded) from IED attacks
dropped even further after MRAPs arrived.
By the time 10,000 MRAPs were deployed
in December 2008, the percentage of U.S.
casualties in Iraq attributable to the IED
attacks that MRAPs were designed to defend
against had dropped precipitously. As figure 3
illustrates, when MRAPs began to flow to Iraq
in November 2007, almost 60 percent of U.S.
casualties were attributed to IEDs. Just over
a year later, with 10,000 MRAPs in country,
only 5 percent of casualties were attribut
able to IEDs, even though insurgents were
targeting the vehicles with IEDs for symbolic
reasons.14 In short, General Magnus’s testi
mony in March 2007 to the effect that MRAPs
could “cut casualties by perhaps as much as
two-thirds” seems well founded.
It is natural to speculate about the
impact of fielding MRAPs earlier. Using
the same MRAP fielding timelines from
later in the war, and assuming other factors
are held constant, we can postulate the
effect if MRAPs had been fielded after the
receipt of the first urgent needs statement
in February 2005. Arguably, MRAPs would
have achieved an even more dramatic reduc
tion in IED effectiveness earlier in the war
since other counter-IED efforts were not
yet bearing fruit. But even the two-thirds
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Representative Hunter noted, the advantages
the MRAP has over a Humvee are clear: “It’s
a simple formula. A vehicle that’s 1 foot off
the ground gets 16 times that [blast] impact
that you get in a vehicle that’s 4 feet off the
ground,” such as the MRAP.15 However, the
higher clearance and heavier armor also
make the vehicle less stable and diminish
mobility, making it impossible to navigate
narrow urban streets or rough off-road
terrain. The new MRAP All Terrain Vehicle
being developed for the rugged terrain of
Afghanistan, where IED use and effectiveness
are on the rise, is smaller and designed to
minimize the tradeoff between mobility and
survivability. The future vehicle is supposed
to provide the “same level of protection as the
previous MRAPs [used in Iraq], but with the

mobility of a Humvee,”16 which is a difficult
engineering challenge. Since force protection
requirements vary from one irregular conflict
to another, the optimum number and mix of
armored vehicles, and the way they balance
mobility, survivability, and other attributes, is
not self-evident. The relative value of surviv
ability, mobility, and other armored vehicle
attributes is a function of multiple factors,
including the threat posed to U.S. forces,
which evolved over time.
That said, the evolution of the IED threat
does not adequately explain the resistance to
purchasing MRAPs for U.S. forces. First of all,
the requirements system was slow to validate
the need for the vehicles even after insurgents
were using all the major types of IEDs. More
over, Department of Defense (DOD) experts

Figure 4. Hypothetical Reduction in Fatalities from Earlier Fielding of
MRAPs
Figure 7. Hypothetical Reduction in Fatalities from Earlier Fielding of MRAPs
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by Secretary Gates. The lack of enthusiasm for
additional armor was manifest in the argu
ment made by force development leaders that
insurgents would simply build bigger IEDs in
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The contention that additional armor
is futile because it can be defeated is not a
good requirements argument. By that logic,

the lack of enthusiasm for
additional armor was manifest
in the argument made by
force development leaders
that insurgents would simply
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we would never use armor for any purpose.
Armor has value not because it is invulnerable
but because it makes the enemy’s job more dif
ficult and the tasks of U.S. forces easier. As one
commander of a division in Baghdad noted,
MRAPs forced insurgents to build bigger and
more sophisticated bombs. Those bombs take
more time and resources to make and set up,
which gives U.S. forces a better chance of catch
ing the insurgents in the act. The extra armor
also boosts the confidence of U.S. troops and
permits a quick response to ambushes. The
requirement for MRAPs was acknowledged
slowly because they are useful primarily for a
limited defensive purpose in irregular warfare
campaigns such as Iraq and Afghanistan that
Service leaders prefer to avoid and hope will
be short-lived. In this regard, the Pentagon
requirements system was true to its historical
mindset, which discounts the importance and
persistence of irregular warfare.
Irregular Warfare and Force Protection. Pentagon officials defend the general
lack of readiness for IEDs by arguing the
threat could not have been anticipated, but
the need for better vehicular protection was
evident long before the intervention in Iraq.
As is well understood, irregular warriors
typically hide among noncombatants, so they
n dupress.ndu.edu
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are not easily identified and defeated and use
ambushes and other hit-and-run tactics to
bleed and frustrate regular forces. Because
insurgents are hard to find and use ambush
tactics, a patient strategy of securing the
population is required to defeat them. When
the population feels secure, it is more likely to
provide information to help locate the insur
gents and avoid their ambushes.
Yet such a patient strategy requires
sustained support from the U.S. public, which
is more likely to offer that support when costs,
including American casualties, remain low in
comparison with perceived national interests
and discernible progress. Since the Iraq War
was controversial from the beginning and
progress was not evident, it was particularly
important to limit casualties. The number of
Americans who thought the level of U.S. mili
tary casualties in Iraq was “acceptable” given
the goals of the war dropped from a slight
majority in June 2003 to 21 percent by the
end of 2006.18 Support in Congress declined
as well, and members of both parties were
emphatic about the need to give the military
every possible means of reducing casualties.
Thus, force protection in irregular
warfare is a strategic imperative because

costs must be kept low in comparison with
perceived interests and progress, and it is
a tactical imperative because hit-and-run
attacks at close quarters and from any direc
tion are the norm. This is why counterinsur
gents historically invest more in key infra
structure protection, static fortifications to
protect lines of communication (blockhouses
or fortified operating bases), and improved
force protection on the march. Convoys
that transport and supply the forces that
constantly pursue the insurgents and protect
the population must include well-armored
vehicles that serve as firing platforms to
quickly counter ambushes.
Lessons from past U.S. participation in
irregular warfare emphasize the importance
of force protection and armored mobility.19
The up-armored Humvee program originated
with the U.S. intervention in Somalia, but
soon after U.S. forces left there the program
was phased out, only to be rushed forward
again when troops were sent to Bosnia. Both
of these emergency acquisition efforts waned
quickly after the intervention. Only the U.S.
Army Military Police, which specialize in
population security, showed sustained inter
est in the up-armored Humvee program and

ASVs. By the time U.S. forces went to Iraq,
only 2 percent of the Army’s 110,000 Humvees
were armored, and only the Military Police
were equipped with ASVs. For these and other
reasons, the DOD inspector general’s report
on MRAPs correctly concluded that DOD
should have been better prepared to provide
armored vehicles for irregular warfare.20
Two qualifications may be raised to the
proposition that the Pentagon should have
been better prepared for the enhanced vehicu
lar armor requirements of irregular warfare.
First, force protection is not an end in itself.
Instead, “aggressive saturation patrolling,
ambushes, and listening post operations must
be conducted, risk shared with the populace,
and contact maintained.”21 Withdrawing
inside of large, well-fortified vehicles may
seem like the tactical equivalent of retreat
ing to large bases. On the contrary, as the
new U.S. counterinsurgency manual notes,
counterinsurgents must treat “every logistic
package or resupply operation [as] a mounted
combat operation” and appreciate the need
for special equipment, including up-armored
vehicles and specialized mine-clearing equip
ment (that is, MRAPs).22 A higher level of
protected mobility for troops conducting

U.S. Army (Ronald Shaw, Jr.)

Soldier views damage to a vehicle caused by
roadside IED in Baghdad
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counterinsurgency supports rather than
undermines an aggressive tactical spirit.
The second qualification is that prior
to Iraq it was not clear that DOD needed to
invest in a large fleet of MRAPs. As noted,
determining the optimum number and mix
of armored vehicles for irregular warfare is
a difficult requirements problem. However,
one way to illustrate the extent to which the
United States should have anticipated the
force protection requirements in Iraq is by
comparing the U.S. experience there with the
performance of other countries. Historically,
forces well prepared for irregular warfare
have fielded MRAP variants, but more typi
cally they have had to compromise between
better protected armored personnel carriers
(APCs) with heavier armor and less visibility
for the occupants and more mobile vehicles

the absence of up-armored Humvees, ASVs,
or other armored car variants prior to Iraq
is much more difficult to justify than the
pre-war absence of a large fleet of much more
expensive and heavy MRAPs.
Once the nature of the IED challenge in
Iraq became apparent, however, MRAPs should
have been fielded expeditiously. Instead, the
Services hoped to get by with less expensive uparmored Humvees. Adding armor to a Humvee
costs only $14,000; up-armored Humvees cost
twice as much as the unarmored version (about
$200,000), and MRAPs can cost three to seven
times as much as an up-armored Humvee,
from $600,000 to over $1 million per vehicle.
The $25 billion cost projected for MRAPs is
high but not indefensible. Congress provided
annual supplemental war funding in the hun
dreds of billions of dollars, and the overall cost

incredibly, several months after the Secretary of Defense declared
MRAPs the top defense acquisition priority, his subordinates were
explaining to Congress that MRAPs would be put in storage
with better visibility and less protection. Some
form of armored car variant is typically the
result. Other national forces deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan with better armored car
variants than the United States, but they too
were left scrambling for MRAPs.23 If we hold
ourselves to the standards of other countries,

of the Iraq War is estimated at over $1.6 tril
lion. Moreover, the cold-blooded observation
made by Senators24 and other sources is that
protecting people in an all-volunteer military
is cheaper than replacing them. The cost of
enlisted casualties averages $500,000 each,
while the cost for officer casualties, depending

on military occupation, ranges from $1 million
to $2 million each. Considered in this context,
and given their value for countering IEDs and
reducing casualties, MRAPs were more than
a bargain, and the same is true of up-armored
Humvees. Yet DOD refused to invest in better
armored vehicles such as the up-armored
Humvee before Iraq and was slow to field the
MRAPs during the conflict. This tendency to
ignore irregular warfare requirements is not an
aberration but a persistent trend.
The Pentagon Record on Irregular
Warfare Requirements. Incredibly, several
months after the Secretary of Defense
declared MRAPs the top defense acquisition
priority, his subordinates were explaining
to Congress that MRAPs would be put in
storage because “Service chiefs have indi
cated that these are heavy, large vehicles that
might not fit well with mobile expeditionary
missions.”25 The observation that MRAPs
will not be a good fit for future conflicts
is odd since DOD strategy and planning
guidance has long insisted irregular warfare
will be a major element of the future threat
environment. The perspective of the Service
chiefs is at odds with national security
policy and defense planning, but it is entirely
consistent with historic Service positions in
the Pentagon’s longstanding debate over the
nature and precise definition of irregular
warfare capabilities.
Soldiers install up-armored kits on
Humvees in Afghanistan
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This debate heated up in response to
the war on terror, figured prominently in the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and was
further elevated by Secretary Gates, who made
the case publicly that the Pentagon is unable
to generate a proper balance of conventional
and irregular warfare capabilities. To correct
this shortcoming, Secretary Gates issued a
policy directive that declares irregular warfare
is just as important as traditional warfare and
that the military must be equally proficient
at both; then he promulgated a new defense
strategy that emphasizes irregular warfare
capabilities; then he followed up by announc
ing the termination or reduction of some
major weapons programs to pay for more
irregular warfare capabilities. Yet past experi
ence suggests that it will be difficult to thrust
irregular warfare capabilities on the Services.
When pressed to invest in irregular
warfare, the Services argue equipment should
be equally effective in all types of conflicts. In
the case of armored vehicles, the argument is
made that those currently under development
will meet all future requirements, including
those for irregular warfare. Thus, the emerg
ing preference is for “scalable armor” added
to an all-purpose chassis that bears up well
regardless of the levels of armored protection
it carries. Such versatility is desirable but of
course difficult to achieve. When circum
stances demand the urgent procurement of
irregular warfare equipment, such capabilities
typically are abandoned shortly after the con
flict fades from memory. This happened with
up-armored Humvees and, before that, with
slower fixed-wing aircraft for reconnaissance
and close fire support as well as brown and
green water vessels that patrol coastlines and
inland waterways. The likely prognosis for
MRAPs would be the same absent interven
tion by the Secretary of Defense.
Secretary Gates wants to “institution
alize procurement of [irregular] warfare
capabilities” so they can be quickly fielded
when needed. The source of resistance to this
goal is not the Pentagon’s acquisition system.
As acquisition professionals emphasize and
the MRAP experience illustrates, it is impos
sible to procure anything without a validated
requirement and congressional funding.
Once senior leadership validated the require
ment and provided resources, the acquisition
system fielded large numbers of MRAPs
within 18 months—an accomplishment
often described as an industrial feat not seen
ndupres s.ndu.edu

since World War II. Instead, the long delay
in fielding MRAPs is attributable first to the
Pentagon’s force development or requirements
system, second to Service cultures that gener
ally undervalue irregular warfare capabilities,
and finally to the Pentagon’s decisionmaking
structure and processes, which typically favor
specialization over integration of diverse areas
of expertise to solve complex problems. Secre
tary Gates seems to appreciate the complexity
of the problem. He has argued, “In the end,
the military capabilities we need cannot be
separated from the cultural traits and reward
structure of the institutions we have.”26 Hope
fully, the Secretary’s broader understanding
of the problem—and hence the proper scope
of required reform—will not get lost in the
rush to revise the current defense program or
reform the acquisition system. JFQ
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